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CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

FIRST PRINCIPLES FOR FORUM PROVISIONS
Daniel B. Listwa† and Bradley J. Polivka*

In the closely watched case of Sciabacucchi v. Salzberg, Vice Chancellor
Laster struck down as invalid provisions in three Delaware-incorporated
companies’ charters that required complaints brought under the Securities Act of
1933 to be filed in federal district court—and not state court. Although a cuttingedge issue of law, Vice Chancellor Laster resolved the issue by appealing to ancient
“first principles”—namely, the notion that each state’s sovereignty is territorially
limited.
In this Essay, we argue that the Salzberg opinion’s appeal to territoriality as
a decisive “first principle” is deeply misguided. The notion that each state’s
legislative jurisdiction is bounded by its territorial limits is a formalist and arbitrary
notion that has been broadly rejected by various jurisdictions, including Delaware.
Moreover, an opinion truly grounded in “first principles” would take comity—the
basic framework for choice of law in the early Republic—as its lodestar,
necessitating a functionally and strategically sensitive approach to determining the
validity of the federal forum provisions. In this case, comity would recommend not
invalidating the forum provisions, as Vice Chancellor Laster did, but rather
dismissing the suit for lack of ripeness.

†
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INTRODUCTION
In the closely watched case of Sciabacucchi v. Salzberg,1 Vice
Chancellor Laster invalidated federal forum–selection provisions
appearing in the certificates of incorporation of three Delaware
corporations, concluding that they were beyond the scope of
permissibility under Delaware law.2 Remarkably, the opinion grounded
its reasoning in what Vice Chancellor Laster referred to as “first
principles.”3 At the heart of these first principles was territoriality—the
notion that no state can legislate as to matters falling outside its territorial
bounds, except to the extent such a matter falls within the scope of the
internal affairs doctrine.4 Finding that the internal affairs doctrine does
not reach federal securities claims, Vice Chancellor Laster held the forum
provisions were invalid attempts to extend Delaware law beyond its
territorial limits.5
The Salzberg opinion’s appeal to territoriality as a decisive “first
principle” is deeply misguided. The notion that each state’s legislative
jurisdiction is bounded by its territorial limits is formalist and arbitrary
and has been broadly rejected by various jurisdictions, including
Delaware.6 Moreover, fundamental notions of state sovereignty cannot

No. CV 2017-0931-JTL, 2018 WL 6719718 (Del. Ch. Dec. 19, 2018).
Id. at *1.
3 Id. at *18–23.
4 Id. at *20. The internal affairs doctrine provides that matters relating to the “internal affairs”
of a corporation are governed by the laws of the state of incorporation, regardless of where the
corporation operates or is headquartered. Id.
5 Id. at *21.
6 See infra text accompanying notes 53–62.
1
2
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explain this understanding of the territoriality of state authority. Although
it has long been assumed that historic conceptions of state sovereignty
placed territorial limits on legislative jurisdiction, a more accurate
reconstruction of the dominant approach to choice of law in the early
Republic reveals that not to be the case. Instead, the basic framework was
one of comity, a functionalist conception of choice of law that recognizes
the practical necessity to interstate commerce of mutually recognized
choice-of-law rules.7
An opinion truly grounded in first principles would take comity as
its lodestar. Although comity might, in certain circumstances, justify
invalidating these provisions out of deference to Delaware’s sister states
and their interests in maintaining control over litigation impacting their
domiciliaries, no such justification is applicable here. Instead, the
outcome most consistent with comity is to dismiss Salzberg on appeal for
lack of ripeness. This will allow other state courts to express their views
on these provisions before Delaware makes its final determination—
placing Delaware in a sounder strategic position.
I. INTERLOCKING INTERESTS AND THE PROCEDURAL BACKDROP
In recent years, corporations have adopted forum-selection
provisions in an effort to gain an upper hand over the plaintiffs’ bar in
securities litigation.8 But as the court’s decision in Salzberg itself reveals,
any effort to modify the rules risks running afoul of state or federal
interests. This Part lays out the interlocking sets of procedural law bearing
on the validity of the federal forum provisions at issue in Salzberg.
A.

Federal Securities Landscape: Puzzles and Solutions

An understanding of the current debate over federal forum–selection
clauses is impossible without an appreciation of the procedural landscape
of federal securities law. The Securities Act of 1933,9 the first federal
securities law, regulates the issuance and distribution of securities. It
provides, for example, a cause of action to a shareholder who purchases
securities in an initial public offering (IPO) that involves faulty
disclosures.10 The 1933 Act was enacted in the shadow of the Great
See infra Section II.B.
See Keith F. Higgins et al., A Fresh Look at Exclusive Forum Provisions, ROPES & GRAY 1
(May 28, 2019), https://www.ropesgray.com/-/media/Files/articles/2019/05/20190528_SPC_
Article.pdf (noting that forum provisions relating to 1933 Act claims began to appear “[s]everal
years ago”).
9 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2018).
10 Id. § 77l.
7
8
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Depression, a moment when fear of corporate and stock market abuses
ran high. In line with the times, the statute gave to plaintiffs “a nearabsolute right to choose their preferred forum,” as it provided for
concurrent state and federal jurisdiction and barred the removal of actions
brought in state courts.11
It was not long, however, before concern over the abuse of these
causes of action arose.12 Out of a desire to limit opportunistic securities
litigation under both the 1933 Act and the Securities Exchange Act,13
which regulates trading in secondary markets, Congress in 1998 enacted
the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA).14 The
legislation, in conjunction with other procedural reforms to the securities
laws, effectively curtailed a large swath of securities class action
litigation.15 Recently, however, in Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver County
Employees Retirement Fund,16 the Supreme Court held that SLUSA
altered neither the 1933 Act’s grant of jurisdiction to state courts nor its
bar on removal.17 As a result, a single category of state-court class action
remains viable: one which exclusively alleges a violation of the 1933 Act.
This final route for forum shopping has apparently been a boon to
ambitious plaintiffs’ lawyers, who have had more success bringing
securities suits in state courts than in federal courts. 18 The Court’s
decision in Cyan opened the door to an innovative defensive strategy: the
adoption of “federal forum” provisions in corporate charters or bylaws
designating the federal courts as the exclusive forum for litigating claims
under the 1933 Act.19 These federal forum–selection provisions require
dismissal of 1933 Act claims brought in state court while providing the
plaintiff the opportunity to refile in federal court.

11 Mitchell A. Lowenthal & Shiwon Choe, State Courts Lack Jurisdiction to Hear Securities
Act Class Actions, But the Frequent Failure to Ask the Right Question Too Often Produces the
Wrong Answer, 17 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 739, 747 (2015).
12 See Dabney v. Alleghany Corp., 164 F. Supp. 28, 33 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (discussing the
concerns with “strike suits” that had developed by 1934 (citation omitted)).
13 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78qq (2018).
14 Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (1998).
15 See id.
16 138 S. Ct. 1061 (2018).
17 See id. at 1066.
18 See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Petitioners at 19, Cyan, 138 S.
Ct. 1061 (No. 15-1439). But cf. Brief of Amici Curiae Federal Jurisdiction and Securities Law
Scholars in Support of Respondents at 24–25, 138 S. Ct. 1061 (No. 15-1439).
19 Cf. Boris Feldman & Ignacio Salceda, After Cyan: Some Prognostications, LAW360 (Mar.
23, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1025703/after-cyansome-prognostications [https://
perma.cc/NQ5F-RZBE] (predicting the adoption of such clauses in Cyan’s wake).
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Delaware Law and the Open Question

Forum-selection provisions of various kinds have quickly become
familiar tools for corporations seeking to counteract potentially abusive
shareholder litigation.20 In the influential opinion in Boilermakers Local
154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corp.,21 then-Chancellor Strine found
forum-selection bylaws relating to internal affairs matters facially valid.22
The bylaws, he explained, were one part of a “broader contract among
the directors, officers, and stockholders formed within the statutory
framework” of the Delaware corporate code.23 Delaware law, he noted,
gave the corporation a great deal of freedom to regulate its own
business.24 Thus, and in the absence of explicit statutory language on
point, Chancellor Strine held that such clauses are not inconsistent with
Delaware law.25
Just one year later, in ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund,26
the Delaware Supreme Court extended Chancellor Strine’s reasoning by
upholding the validity a “fee-shifting” bylaw, which would allow the
corporation to recover fees against shareholders who bring a losing claim
against the firm.27 Stating that “corporate bylaws are ‘contracts among a
corporation’s shareholders,’” the Court held that the fee-shifting bylaw
fell within the bounds permitted by Delaware law.28
The Delaware legislature quickly enacted legislation addressing
both opinions. The new law endorses the decision in Boilermakers by
explicitly allowing for bylaws or charter clauses making Delaware courts
the exclusive forum for “any or all internal corporate claims,”29 but it
rejects the ATP decision.30 The statute only addresses forum selection and

20 See, e.g., OLGA KOUMRIAN, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION
INVOLVING ACQUISITIONS OF PUBLIC COMPANIES: REVIEW OF 2014 M&A LITIGATION 3 (2015),
https://www.cornerstone.com/GetAttachment/897c61ef-bfde-46e6-a2b8-5f94906c6ee2/
Shareholder-Litigation-Involving-Acquisitions-2014-Review.pdf [https://perma.cc/T228-TGDX]
(noting that “[m]ore than 300 companies” adopted forum-selection provisions related to fiduciary
duty litigation).
21 73 A.3d 934 (Del. Ch. 2013).
22 Id. at 939.
23 Id.
24 Id. (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109 (West 2013)).
25 Id.
26 91 A.3d 554 (Del. 2014).
27 Id. at 558.
28 Id. (quoting Airgas, Inc. v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 8 A.3d 1182, 1188 (Del. 2010)). For
further discussion of the concept of the contract as the foundation of business entities in Delaware,
see Daniel B. Listwa, Cooperative Covenants: Good Faith for the Alternative Entity, 24 STAN. J.L.
BUS. & FIN. 137 (2019).
29 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 115 (West 2017).
30 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 102(f), 109(b) (West 2017).
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fee shifting as they relate to “internal corporate claims”; that is, those
claims falling within the scope of the internal affairs doctrine.31 This left
open the question of whether similar provisions—either forum-selection
or fee-shifting—were permissible in the context of suits asserting
substantive claims outside the scope of the internal affairs doctrine, such
as those based in federal securities law. But, with the adoption of federal
forum provisions beginning in earnest following Cyan, it was only a
matter of time before they, too, were tested.
II. RECOVERING FIRST PRINCIPLES
In Sciabacucchi v. Salzberg,32 Vice Chancellor Laster held invalid
under Delaware law federal forum provisions in three corporations’
certificates of incorporation.33 Vice Chancellor Laster offered two
rationales for his decision. The first sought to ground the invalidity of the
federal forum–selection provisions largely by reference to the analysis in
Boilermakers and the legislature’s subsequent codification of that case’s
holding.34 Although Vice Chancellor Laster’s analysis was questionable,
the key issues of statutory interpretation have no easy answers, as the
statute’s language does not address forum-selection provisions.35 It was
likely this difficulty that led Vice Chancellor Laster to offer his second
rationale, based not on precedent or statutory text, but on “first
principles.” Relying on “fundamental starting points” regarding the
“concept of the corporation” and the nature of the state’s sovereignty, he
set out to explain why federal forum provisions are necessarily invalid
because they seek to stretch Delaware’s law beyond its proper legislative
jurisdiction.36

31 Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Norman M. Monhait, Fee-Shifting Bylaws: A Study in
Federalism, INST. OF DEL. CORP. & BUS. LAW (June 29, 2015), http://blogs.law.widener.edu/
delcorp/2015/06/29/fee-shifting-bylaws-a-study-in-federalism [https://perma.cc/MMP6-E68W].
32 No. CV 2017-0931-JTL, 2018 WL 6719718 (Del. Ch. Dec. 19, 2018).
33 Id. at *3.
34 Id. at *15–18.
35 Vice Chancellor Laster adopted Chancellor Strine’s distinction in Boilermakers between
bylaws that pertain to the plaintiff’s relationship with the company as a stockholder (such as forumselection clauses for fiduciary-duty actions), and those that merely regulate “external matters” that
do not implicate the plaintiff’s status as a stockholder. Id. at *1 (citing Boilermakers Local 154 Ret.
Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 951–52 (Del. Ch. 2013)). Vice Chancellor Laster argued that
the provision at issue in Sciabacucchi similarly sought to regulate an “external matter,” as the 1933
Act provides a right to the individual as a “purchaser” of the share, not as a stockholder. Id. at *2.
However, and in contrast to the hypotheticals posed by Strine in Boilermakers, the same nucleus
of facts may establish the plaintiff as both a purchaser and a shareholder.
36 See id. at *18.
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“First Principles”

The heart of Vice Chancellor Laster’s “first principles” argument
appeals to the boundaries of the internal affairs doctrine and its
relationship to broader notions of legislative jurisdiction. Each state, the
opinion explains, can “exercise authority over actors and activities within
their territorial jurisdictions (or which have sufficient nexus with their
territorial jurisdictions).”37
Against this background of exclusively territorial jurisdiction, Vice
Chancellor Laster characterized the internal affairs doctrine—which
subjects matters relating to the “internal affairs” of a corporation to the
laws of the state of incorporation, regardless of where the corporation
operates or is headquartered38—as a limited exception.39 According to
Salzberg, the internal affairs doctrine emerges from the special
relationship between the state and the corporation. The charter, he
explains, is not a typical contract between private parties.40 Rather, the
charter “gives rise to an artificial entity,” “a ‘body corporate.’”41 The
reason the charter is able to generate these rights is because its issuance
is “a sovereign act”;42 as a result, the incorporating state’s “sovereign
authority” structures its rights and powers.43 This gives the state “the
power through its corporation law to regulate the corporation’s internal
affairs,” such as “the rights, powers and privileges of shares of stock” and
the “composition and structure of the board of directors,” even where the
state would otherwise lack “sufficient nexus” for territorial jurisdiction.44
But this exception to the background principles of territoriality is limited
and does not extend to matters that “do not arise out of internal corporate
relationships.”45 Vice Chancellor Laster explained that “a federal claim
under the 1933 Act is a clear example of an external claim.”46 For this
reason, a 1933 Act claim is beyond the reach of the internal affairs
doctrine and is outside the purview of Delaware law. Accordingly, the
federal forum provisions are invalid.47
On one level, Vice Chancellor Laster’s reasoning is unexceptional.
Settled Delaware precedent holds that the internal affairs doctrine is
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47

Id. at *20.
See generally id. at *20; supra note 4.
See Sciabacucchi, 2018 WL 6719718, at *21.
See id. at *19.
Id. at *18.
Id.
Id. at *19.
Id. at *20.
Id. at *21.
Id. at *22.
Id. at *23.
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constitutionally mandated.48 Additionally, the courts have frequently
characterized the doctrine as a narrow exception to the general rule of
territorial jurisdiction.49 From there, the conclusion that Delaware’s law
is invalid if it extends extraterritorially but does not fall within the internal
affairs doctrine is understandable. But while this argument from “first
principles” may find some purchase in the context of the internal affairs
doctrine, it fails to square with the true history of conflicts of laws, both
nationally and in Delaware.
The Court of Chancery ought to be forgiven for failing to articulate
the source of its territorial principle. The problems of identifying the
provenance of choice-of-law rules and limitations on legislative
jurisdiction have plagued courts for at least a century.50 Neither state
legislatures nor Congress provide significant direction for choice-of-law
issues, leaving courts to look elsewhere for guidance. Indeed, this makes
choice of law an area of great scholarly influence, sometimes leading to
abrupt and dramatic theoretical realignments.51
The foundational scholarly intervention into modern choice of law
was Joseph Beale’s “vested rights” theory, which dominated both
classroom and courtroom for the first half of the twentieth century.52
Beale argued that each state’s legislative jurisdiction is strictly
circumscribed by its territorial boundaries—a notion endorsed in
Salzberg.53 Indeed, as in Vice Chancellor Laster’s opinion, Beale
grounded his theory in the very nature of sovereignty, purportedly arising
a priori from first principles: each state’s sovereign authority is
inherently connected to its physical jurisdiction, thus no state can create
law that extends beyond its borders.54
Beale’s theory carries an abstract appeal. By precisely partitioning
every jurisdiction’s legislative jurisdiction to remove overlap, it
ostensibly leaves no discretion to courts. The courts embraced this
48 See, e.g., VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108, 1116 (Del.
2005) (citing CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987)).
49 Cf., e.g., FdG Logistics LLC v. A&R Logistics Holdings, Inc., 131 A.3d 842, 853–54 (Del.
Ch. 2016), aff’d sub nom. A & R Logistics Holdings, Inc. v. FdG Logistics LLC, 148 A.3d 1171
(Del. 2016).
50 See generally Lea Brilmayer, The Problem of Provenance: The Proper Place of Ethical
Reasoning in the Selection of Applicable Law, in THE ROLE OF ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
101 (Donald Earl Childress III ed., 2012) (discussing the challenge of grounding a theory of choice
of law).
51 See Stewart E. Sterk, The Marginal Relevance of Choice of Law Theory, 142 U. PA. L. REV.
949, 949 (1994).
52 See Erwin N. Griswold, Mr. Beale and the Conflict of Laws, 56 HARV. L. REV. 690, 690,
693–94 (1943); Bruce Wardhaugh, From Natural Law to Legal Realism: Legal Philosophy, Legal
Theory, and the Development of American Conflict of Laws Since 1830, 41 ME. L. REV. 307, 325
(1989).
53 Supra text accompanying notes 4–5, 32–47.
54 1 JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 4.12, at 46 (1935).
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simplification of the judicial task, leading to the theory’s broad adoption
and endorsement in the Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws.55 But
Beale’s theory soon came under fervent attack from legal realists. The
realists denied that there was anything inherent in the nature of law
supporting Beale’s strictly territorial construction of the law.56 In their
view, his “theory” of vested rights and sovereignty was merely a façade
built to obscure the discretion of judges.57
The realist critique set off the “conflict-of-law revolution.”58 In
reality, however, the aftermath of the rejection of Beale’s theory has
primarily been fragmentation. Courts today embrace a variety of choiceof-law theories, with some retaining the territorial model.59 Notably,
Delaware has instead embraced the approach set out in the revisionist
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws—a flexible but unpredictable
methodology based around a multi-factor balancing test.60 The
Restatement (Second) provides little theoretical discussion and is
considered an unruly mess by academic literature,61 but it correctly
jettisons Beale’s territorialist view. Instead, the Restatement (Second)
assumes each state’s law extends as broadly as is constitutionally
permissible, leaving courts to choose which of the overlapping
jurisdictions’ laws is most appropriately applied in a particular case.62
Placed in historical context, the Salzberg opinion looks like an
attempt to revive a long-buried relic. Delaware joined the conflicts
revolution decades ago when it accepted the Restatement (Second) and
rejected the territorial theory as an arbitrary restraint on judicial

55 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 311 (AM. LAW INST. 1934). Of course,
Beale himself was the Reporter for the Restatement (First).
56 See Wardhaugh, supra note 52, at 341.
57 See L.L. Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 429, 435 (1934).
58 SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION: PAST, PRESENT,
AND FUTURE 1 (2006).
59 Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2017: Thirty-First Annual
Survey, 66 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 61 (2018).
60 See Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, London v. Chemtura Corp., 160 A.3d 457, 464–65 (Del.
2017) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 (AM. LAW INST. 1971));
Kermit Roosevelt III, The Myth of Choice of Law: Rethinking Conflicts, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2448,
2466 (1999) (arguing that with respect to torts, for example, the Restatement (Second) “lists a
dizzying number of factors with no hint as to their relative weight” (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 6, 145)). Dissatisfaction with the Restatement (Second) has
led to the development of a Restatement (Third), which is currently being drafted. See Lea
Brilmayer & Daniel B. Listwa, Continuity and Change in the Draft Restatement (Third) of Conflict
of Laws: One Step Forward and Two Steps Back?, 128 YALE L.J. FORUM 266, 267 (2018).
61 See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, Real Conflicts, 69 B.U. L. REV. 1, 77 (1989) (“The Second
Restatement[] . . . mystifies rather than clarifies . . . .”).
62 Kermit Roosevelt III, Brainerd Currie’s Contribution to Choice of Law: Looking Back,
Looking Forward, 65 MERCER L. REV. 501, 515 (2014).
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discretion.63 Applied to Salzberg, the Restatement (Second) approach
would recommend upholding the facial validity of these provisions,
leaving subsequent courts to decide whether to enforce an individual
provision when the issue arises.
Even the Restatement (Second) approach, however, is ultimately
unsatisfactory. The most contentious invocation of federal forum–
selection clauses will be when defendants move courts such as
California’s to dismiss and allow for refiling in federal court. California
courts’ responses to such motions might be different from those of, say,
New York courts. The Court of Chancery, and ultimately the Delaware
Supreme Court, may well have an interest in intervening to provide for a
uniform result or to otherwise have a say in the functioning of these
provisions. But to do so, Delaware must adopt a more sophisticated
choice-of-law model than that offered by the Restatement (Second). The
next Section lays out such a model based on a principle even more
fundamental than those to which Vice Chancellor Laster appealed:
comity.
B.

Comity and True First Principles

Although most modern commentators mistakenly trace Beale’s
territorial view to the early 1800s,64 the prevailing choice-of-law model
in the nineteenth century assumed a very different notion of the
relationship between territory and sovereignty. As Justice Story described
in his Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws, the reach of each state’s
courts over foreign litigants was tightly circumscribed by the state’s
geographical boundaries.65 Any effort to adjudicate the rights of a person
or property outside of that territorial reach would be considered invalid
by other courts and in violation of the law of nations.66 But, once a
defendant was served process within the state’s territory, its courts could
adjudicate any dispute according to the law of the forum—even if the
conduct in question occurred elsewhere.67 In modern terminology,

63 Cf. Oliver B. Cannon & Son, Inc. v. Dorr-Oliver, Inc., 394 A.2d 1160, 1166 (Del. 1978)
(applying Delaware law because “th[e] State ha[d] such a close relationship to the transaction” at
issue).
64 See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The
Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 252 (1992).
65 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC, IN
REGARD TO CONTRACT, RIGHTS AND REMEDIES, AND SPECIFICALLY IN REGARD TO MARRIAGES,
DIVORCES, WILLS, SUCCESSIONS, AND JUDGMENTS § 21 (2d ed. 1841) (1834).
66 See William S. Dodge, International Comity in American Law, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2071,
2085–86 (2015).
67 See Hessel E. Yntema, The Comity Doctrine, 65 MICH. L. REV. 9, 18–19 (1966). This
distinction can be seen in the fact that state court decisions that violated the limits of personal
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personal jurisdiction, but not legislative jurisdiction, was territorially
limited.
This authority to apply forum law to any matter within the
jurisdiction of a state’s courts was considered an important aspect of each
states’ sovereignty. It was also understood, however, that such a system
could breed a great deal of uncertainty, potentially crippling interstate
commerce.68 For this reason, nineteenth-century American courts
embraced the notion of comity—a concept that originated among Dutch
jurists more than a century earlier as a model for international
adjudication,69 but which was embraced as similarly applicable to the
American states.70 Today, comity is a term that is both familiar and
misunderstood.71 Although courts—including Delaware’s—refer to
comity in the context of considering how their rulings will affect other
jurisdictions, it is generally understood as a narrow doctrine of abstention,
applying only when a court decides not to exercise its authority to avoid
affronting another state’s interests.72 Justice Story explicitly denied this
narrow understanding of the comity framework, explaining that it
represents an essential aspect of the relationship between sovereigns.73
While it was the law of nations that required a state to adhere to the strict
territorial rules of personal jurisdiction, it was the “comity of nations”
that generally motivated a jurisdiction to adopt voluntarily rules—usually
as a matter of local common law—directing its courts to enforce the law
of a sister state rather than forum law in certain circumstances.74
The goal of comity was to guide the states into independently
adopting a uniform set of choice-of-law rules—ensuring, for example,
that every contract would be enforced according to the law of the place
in which it was made, regardless of where the subsequent contract dispute
was adjudicated. There was nothing inherent in the nature of sovereignty
demanding that these choice-of-law rules be adhered to. Rather, the state
jurisdiction were subject to collateral attack, while those inconsistent with the comity-derived limits
of legislative jurisdiction were not. Compare Kempe’s Lessee v. Kennedy, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 173,
184–86 (1809) (allowing for collateral attack on personal jurisdiction grounds), with Elliott v.
Lessee of Peirsol, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 328, 340–41 (1828) (denying a right to collaterally attack on
choice-of-law grounds).
68 STORY, supra note 65, § 242.
69 Thomas Schultz & Niccolò Ridi, Comity in US Courts, 10 NE. U. L. REV. 280, 291–92
(2018).
70 Id. at 283.
71 See Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E. 198, 201–02 (N.Y. 1918) (Cardozo, J.) (referring
to comity as a “misleading word”).
72 See, e.g., Nat’l Indus. Grp. (Holding) v. Carlyle Inv. Mgmt. L.L.C., 67 A.3d 373, 387 (Del.
2013).
73 Justice Story specifically denied that comity referred to such a grant of individual discretion,
explaining that he was interested in the “comity of nations,” not the “comity of the courts.” See
STORY, supra note 65, § 38.
74 Id.
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would adopt such rules because it would be, Justice Story explained, in
their “mutual interest and utility.”75 This includes, for example, the
modern internal affairs doctrine, which arose not out of some special
metaphysical connection between the corporation and the chartering
state, as the Salzberg opinion suggests, but rather out of interstate
recognition of the need to constrain shareholder opportunism after
personal jurisdiction rules began to liberalize in the late nineteenth
century.76
At the same time, however, it was also understood that, in some
cases, the benefits to be procured from uniformity would not sufficiently
outweigh the benefits of simply applying forum law. In such cases, it
would be consistent with the general notion of comity to adopt a choiceof-law rule that directed the state court to apply its own jurisdiction’s law.
Thus, for example, in Le Roy v. Crowninshield, Justice Story held that it
would be appropriate for a forum court to apply its own statute of
limitations to a claim arising from a contract made outside of the state
because the forum’s interest in adhering to its own procedural rules
outweighed the costs of disuniformity such a rule would introduce.77
As illustrated in Le Roy, the paradigmatic invocation of comity
involved a forum court weighing the interests of its own state against the
benefits that accrue from uniformity across state lines.78 But that
uniformity is only realized if other states adopt similar rules. This means
that comity is fundamentally about considering how one’s choice-of-law
decision will impact and garner responses from other states. In gametheoretical terms, comity captures the idea that each state is a repeat
player in a multi-party coordination problem in which, by sometimes
accommodating the interests of other states, everyone could be made
better off.79 In certain cases, this might demand that a jurisdiction
voluntarily circumscribe the geographic reach of its own laws. For
example, if Nevada thinks that California will not impose Nevada’s
special safety requirements on products sold in Nevada, the state might
preemptively decide not to extend the law’s reach to products originating
in California—concerned that to do otherwise would generate uncertainty
Id. § 25 (citing Blanchard v. Russel, 13 Mass. 1 (1816)).
See Vincent S.J. Buccola, Opportunism and Internal Affairs, 93 TUL. L. REV. 339, 371
(2018).
77 15 F. Cas. 362 (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Mass. 1820) (No. 8269).
78 See Daniel B. Listwa, Jurisdictional Problems, Comity Solutions 15–26 (unpublished
manuscript) (June 26, 2019) (on file with author) (reconstructing Justice Story’s theory of choice
of law).
79 Cf. LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS: FOUNDATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 162
(1991) (using game theory to describe the benefits of reciprocity in choice of law); Lea Brilmayer
& Daniel B. Listwa, A Common Law of Choice of Law (unpublished manuscript) (Aug. 6, 2019)
(on file with authors) (offering a novel theorization of choice of law grounded in game-theoretical
reasoning).
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for manufacturers. More pointedly, Nevada might be worried about
reprisal from California and limit the reach of it law for that reason.
This more future-oriented invocation of comity also has deep roots
in American law and is the basis for the “presumption against
extraterritoriality” that is sometimes relied upon by courts. For example,
in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.,80 the U.S. Supreme Court
held that American antitrust laws did not extend to acts committed in
Costa Rica and Panama.81 In his opinion for the Court, Justice Holmes
grounded his opinion in “the comity of nations,” explaining that
extraterritorial enforcement of the law might provoke just resentment by
the other nations.82 Consistent with comity, the Supreme Court does not
rely on the presumption in every case, but only after balancing the
interests of the U.S. in extending its law against the repercussions of such
an extension.83 The same is true of states that have invoked the
presumption against extraterritoriality in the interstate context.84
An analysis of the validity of the federal forum provisions grounded
in “first principles” clearly should have considered the clauses from the
perspective of comity, not territoriality. The result of a comity analysis
may result in the same outcome reached by Vice Chancellor Laster, but
the Salzberg opinion offers no such inquiry. Instead, it merely cites
territoriality as a decisive, if arbitrary, factor. Heeding the lessons of the
legal realists, one should not be satisfied with that determination.
III. THE COMITY-BASED APPROACH
With the Court of Chancery’s decision in Salzberg now final,85
Delaware’s Supreme Court will soon confront the issue itself. If the Court
is also drawn to offering a reason based in “first principles,” then its first
step must be to consider comity. The outcome most consistent with
comity is to dismiss the case on ripeness grounds, providing an
opportunity for other states’ courts to clarify their positions on these
provisions.
A comity-based approach is ultimately grounded in the interests of
the implicated jurisdictions. Each state has, essentially, two sets of related
213 U.S. 347 (1909).
Id. at 357.
82 Id. at 356.
83 See Dodge, supra note 66, at 2102–03.
84 Hannah L. Buxbaum, Determining the Territorial Scope of State Law in Interstate and
International Conflicts: Comments on the Draft Restatement (Third) and on the Role of Party
Autonomy, 27 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 381, 395 (2017).
85 See Chancery Awards $3M Fees For ‘Significant’ Bylaws Challenge, LAW360 (July 8,
2019),
https://www.law360.com/delaware/articles/1175868/chancery-awards-3m-fees-forsignificant-bylaws-challenge [https://perma.cc/J4AP-3QPD].
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interests: first, in protecting its constituents by retaining the ability to
make an independent judgment about whether the forum-selection
clauses should be enforced; and, second, in the benefits of uniformity.
Ideally, states would negotiate directly to achieve a compromise which
balances both sets of interests. However, state courts are confined to
taking unilateral actions in individual cases.
Comity provides a solution. It recognizes that courts are involved
not in a single-shot prisoner’s dilemma, but rather an iterated
coordination game. Taking this broader view, jurisdictions can
“negotiate” through signaling, deference, and reciprocity. Indeed, that is
essentially the process that has played out for forum-selection provisions
concerning internal affairs. In Galaviz v. Berg,86 one of the first tests of a
unilaterally adopted forum-selection bylaw, the federal court of the
Northern District of California refused to enforce the bylaw as a matter
of federal common law, holding, among other things, that that the
conditions under which the board of directors adopted the provision—
namely, after engaging in allegedly fraudulent behavior—cast suspicion
on whether it was truly adopted with the interests of the shareholders in
mind.87 When Delaware later spoke on the issue in Boilermakers, thenChancellor Strine strongly signaled Delaware’s intention to support these
provisions, but also deferred to the sort of misgivings discussed by the
federal court by recognizing the validity of as-applied challenges.88
The Boilermakers decision signaled a move toward an equilibrium
balancing the different jurisdictions’ interests: joining a strong
presumption of enforceability with a safety valve for as-applied
challenges. Recognizing the value of this compromise, both federal and
state courts have endorsed it by subsequently upholding forum-selection
provisions while retaining the power to decline to enforce such a
provision on an as-applied basis.89 As a result of this indirect dialogue
between jurisdictions, “non-chosen” courts maintain a degree of control
over the enforcement of these provisions while corporations have a fair
degree of confidence that these provisions will be upheld so long as they
are adopted on a “clear day.”90
Salzberg provides a stark contrast to the successful application of
comity in the Boilermakers line of cases. By invalidating the federal
forum provision on a facial challenge, the court in Salzberg eliminated
any possibility for an inter-court dialogue. That is not to say, of course,
that such a decision is necessarily unjustified. Although the court
763 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
See id. at 1175.
88 Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 957 (Del. Ch. 2013).
89 See, e.g., North v. McNamara, 47 F. Supp. 3d 635, 640–43 (S.D. Ohio 2014).
90 See John C. Jorgenson, Note, Drafting Effective Delaware Forum-Selection Clauses in the
Shadow of Enforcement Uncertainty, 102 IOWA L. REV. 353, 373 (2016).
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declined to provide a functionally relevant justification for the restriction,
one could conceive such an argument.
The best comity-based justification for invalidating these provisions
is grounded in the concern that validating them would invite unwelcome
responses from other interested jurisdictions—the same reasoning
offered by Justice Holmes in American Banana.91 While plausible, this
reasoning is ultimately unpersuasive. Consider first the interests of the
federal government. Although Vice Chancellor Laster did not reach the
issue, he noted that the plaintiffs argued that validating the federal forum
provisions would “take Delaware out of its traditional lane of corporate
governance and into the federal lane of securities regulation.”92 As former
Chief Justice Steele has suggested, it is in Delaware’s interest to maintain
a “solid line” between these two lanes to prevent federal incursion into
the realm of corporate law.93 This is but comity by another name.
But while the desire to maintain such separation in the interest of
preventing federal intervention is legitimate, federal forum provisions
present little risk of such intrusions. Congress would likely only intervene
if it decides that restricting shareholders to suits in federal courts in 1933
Act cases runs against the statutory scheme. However, the federal interest
in maintaining the availability of state courts in 1933 Act cases is weak.
While the enacting Congress may have sought to allow for suits in state
court as part of a generally pro-plaintiff orientation, Congress’s
amendments to the statutory scheme have trended toward shifting control
away from the plaintiff.94 Indeed, many courts had long interpreted
SLUSA as depriving state courts of jurisdiction over 1933 Act claims
without any reaction from Congress.95 Moreover, the Supreme Court has
enforced pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate 1933 Act claims, holding
that such agreements do not impinge on the substantive rights provided

See supra text accompanying note 82.
Sciabacucchi v. Salzberg, No. CV 2017-0931-JTL, 2018 WL 6719718, at *23 (Del. Ch. Dec.
19, 2018).
93 See Chief Justice Myron T. Steele, Sarbanes-Oxley: The Delaware Perspective, 52 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 503, 506–07 (2007–08).
94 Although the 1933 Act provided for concurrent state and federal jurisdiction and barred
removal, every subsequent securities statute has taken a more restrictive position. Enacted only a
year later, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 granted federal courts “exclusive jurisdiction” over
claims brought under the statute. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2018). This denial of concurrent jurisdiction is
consistent with the generally higher burden placed on a plaintiff bringing an Exchange Act claim,
as opposed to one grounded in the 1933 Act. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375,
382 (1983) (discussing the “heavier burden” imposed on the plaintiff). In 1995, Congress further
restricted securities suits through the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), which
imposed various procedural requirements for cases in federal courts. Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C.).
95 See, e.g., Knox v. Agria Corp., 613 F. Supp. 2d 419, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (denying state
courts jurisdiction over such claims).
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by the statute.96 It is difficult to see how requiring that such claims be
brought in federal court would be found more problematic from a
federalism perspective than forced arbitration.
Delaware’s sister states, however, might be less willing than
Congress to defer to these forum-selection provisions and would be more
likely to view them as an illegitimate power-grab by Delaware. California
courts may believe that they can more effectively ensure the vindication
of the rights of California securities-purchasers than a federal court. More
problematically, a state court may retain jurisdiction in order to protect
the fees of the local plaintiffs’ bar. For internal affairs suits, states have
reached an equilibrium deferential to Delaware’s jurisdiction.97 But the
balancing of interests applicable to that limited set of cases does not
necessarily extend to federal forum provisions. Delaware courts might be
concerned that sister states will perceive a move to validate federal forum
provisions as an attempt to unreasonably expand the scope of the internal
affairs doctrine, triggering greater scrutiny of the doctrine as a whole and
destabilizing the current equilibrium.
While protecting the current equilibrium is reasonable, an
alternative solution exists which would avoid preemptively invalidating
these important mechanisms for private ordering. The Delaware Supreme
Court can instead dismiss the suit for lack of ripeness, making clear
Delaware’s intention to proceed cautiously in order to respond effectively
to the interests and concerns raised by other courts.
Were the Court to do so, Delaware’s courts would likely have the
opportunity to address the issue once again. If a sister state ever declines
to enforce such a provision, the defendant corporation could attempt to
obtain an anti-suit injunction against the plaintiff in the Delaware Court
of Chancery.98 Then, the Delaware court would not only know that the
other court declined to enforce the provision, but also its reason for doing
so. This would allow the Delaware court to confront the issue in a more
nuanced and reciprocity-oriented manner, much as then-Chancellor
Strine did in Boilermakers.99 Further, if other states decide to enforce
these provisions, then Delaware need not confront the issue at all. If
Delaware were eventually required to issue an anti-suit injunction, it
would be in a strong, consensus-enforcing position to do so. Dismissing
on ripeness grounds leaves open these alternative routes, thus presenting
a superior solution to preemptively striking down the provisions.

Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989).
See supra text accompanying note 76.
98 See Edgen Grp. Inc. v. Genoud, No. 9055-VCL, 2013 WL 5939861 (Del. Ch. Oct. 31, 2013).
99 See supra text accompanying note 88.
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CONCLUSION
By invoking territorial limitations on legislative jurisdiction as a
“first principle” upon which to rest his opinion invalidating federal forum
provisions, Vice Chancellor Laster mistakenly revived a long-buried and
misguided formalism. The territoriality principle is inconsistent with both
the modern choice-of-law model followed by Delaware, which was
heavily influenced by the legal realism movement, and historical
conceptions of state sovereignty dating to the time of the early Republic.
A more accurate appeal to first principles would recommend reliance on
a comity framework, highlighting the strategic considerations that ought
to guide judicial decisions implicating multiple jurisdictions. If Delaware
is concerned, for strategic reasons, with appearing overly aggressive, then
the most comity-oriented solution would be to dismiss Salzberg for lack
of ripeness, allowing other states’ courts to address the issue before
Delaware reaches its final decision.

